For the Courts it has been argued that the term ambiguity refers to words or phrases which have multiple meanings, and “genuine ambiguity” is reserved for text which, based on the modern approach, can be understood as having two or more plausible meanings based on the relevant context (R. v. Kim, 2025, paras. 32-34; R. v. Rousselle, 2025, para 81; La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023, paras 22-24). 

In this section two distinctions noted by the court have been be highlighted: ambiguity and vagueness, and ambiguity and “genuine ambiguity”

With this in mind, although it appears obvious that ambiguity has something to do with uncertainty, what makes it different from other types of uncertainty? 

It has been held in various cases that ambiguity is distinct from that of vagueness and generality (R. v. Kim, 2025, paras. 32-34; Pong Marketing and Promotions Inc. v. Ontario Media Development Corporation, 2018, paras 44-49.). 

Vagueness has been noted as being notoriously difficult conceptually to clarify, but nevertheless has been noted as not relating to difficulty in understanding the central meaning of a term where there are two or more plausible central interpretations of the term. Rather, it has been posited that vagueness occurs when a concept’s boundaries appear unclear. In this, it is unclear how to classify certain things at the borderline of the concepts meaning as to whether they are instances of it or not. 

Furthermore, another distinction listed between vagueness and ambiguity is in regard to intent. In this it has been noted that ambiguity, or at least issues resulting from it, arise from words or phrases which unintentionally have two or more incompatible interpretations. Conversely, language that is vague is sometimes intentionally implemented in legislation, where more concrete specifications are left to specialized actors better suited to this on a case-by-case basis. 

Considering the above, it is clear that in trying to solve issues regarding ambiguity, it appears important to at least separate these from instances of vagueness to avoid trying to “fix” something intentional and permitted. 

Apart from distinguishing ambiguity from vagueness, it should also be mentioned how ambiguity can be different from “genuine ambiguity” 

This section looks at the modern approach to statutory interpretation and how ambiguity has been addressed in reference to this.

The modern approach to statutory interpretation is established as the following:

The words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament (R. v. Rousselle, 2025, para 80).

How this itself is interpreted has been noted as being an approach that considers text, context, and purpose (R. v. Rousselle, 2025, para 81; R. v. Kim, 2025, paras. 31-32) . 

In this, text is a consideration that is necessary but not sufficient. There must be a plain reading of the text’s meaning; however, the text also needs to be understood in its relevant context. Additionally, the purpose of the provision which the text is placed in must also be considered (La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023, paras 22-23). 

With this in mind, in statutory interpretation this is the primary approach to understanding the meaning of a statutory provision (R. v. Rousselle, 2025, para 81). 

As such, it appears clear that a distinction between ambiguity and “genuine ambiguity” is warranted. Although a specific word or phrase’s meaning in a vacuum can be ambiguous, under the modern approach multiple interpretations may appear implausible, often making issues concerning ambiguity irrelevant. “Genuine ambiguity” on the other hand is when multiple plausible interpretations arise from a modern approach, which can create relevant issues in statutory interpretation. 

Although “genuine ambiguity” is rare, when a court is presented with rival interpretations that cannot be resolved by a modern approach, the use of external interpretive aids is permitted (La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023, para 24; R. v. Kim, 2025, paras. 33-34 .  

In this, external aids are materials used that exist outside of a statute’s provisions, context, and purpose. Examples noted by the court have been: 

The principle of strict construction of penal laws or the presumption of conformity with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023, para 24).

Overall, The Courts have noted that ambiguity is specifically reserved for the notion of concepts which have two or more plausible interpretations, that it is distinct from vagueness, and that cases of ambiguity which arise after a modern approach are cases of “genuine ambiguity” where the use of external aids is permitted.

Regarding the meaning of ambiguity and how it is distinct from vagueness, in many ways what the Courts concluded is largely similar to many philosophical positions. Namely that ambiguity is in regard to multiple interpretations and vagueness generally referring to difficulty with the borders of the term (Sennet, 2023). 

Nevertheless, although there have been many cases that consider ambiguity, the main considerations are whether there is an instance of “genuine ambiguity” based on the context, and purpose of a statute, and then if external aids are permitted (R. v. Rousselle, 2025, para 81).

In this, further abstract distinctions regarding types of ambiguity are more difficult to find in statutory interpretation. As such, this section seeks to explore different types of ambiguity noted in the philosophical discourse.

The goal of this is to bring more conceptual clarity as to why certain concepts, words, and phrases are cases of “genuine ambiguity” beyond notions of semantic ambiguity and bearing multiple interpretations. 

Additionally, a secondary goal is to consider whether there could be any benefits to considering these different types of ambiguity in statutory interpretation as external aids.     

Lexical ambiguity refers to words or phrases that are pronounced or spelled the same way, but have different meanings or belong to different syntactic categories (these include nouns, verbs, adjectives, noun phrases, etc.) (Sennet, 2023). In this, examples are those such as the word “bat” where this not only has multiple meanings as a noun, but it also can be placed in different syntactic categories. 

It is similar to that of most semantic ambiguity present in statutory interpretation, where oftentimes the context and purpose of a statute or statement makes it clear what the clear meaning of the term or phrase is (R. v. Kim, 2025, para 33). 

Nevertheless, while in a sense lexical ambiguity is similar to semantic ambiguity, There are more instances of lexical ambiguity. This is because, in addition to including notions of words with different meanings, as is the case with basic semantic ambiguity, it also accounts for terms that are both in reference to the same general concept but are in different categories, such as nouns and verbs.

In regard to syntactic ambiguity, this refers to text having multiple plausible interpretations due to how the text is structured, rather than the specific meanings of words or phrases themselves (Sennet, 2023). 

In this there are many subcategories of syntactic ambiguity, this entry will focus on subcategories which appear to either a.) common instances of ambiguity and b.) be understood without requiring any background information in formal logic.

With this in mind, although these are cases of syntactic ambiguity, based on the modern approach, it seems rare for any type to be inherently likely to cause cases of “genuine ambiguity” (Sennet, 2023; R. v. Rousselle, 2025, para 81).

For thematic ambiguity, it appears that in many cases by interpreting statutes through the modern approach, by considering the purpose of the statute it would clarify any ambiguity regarding whether it is in regard to a subject acting or being acted upon. 

Concerning ambiguity based on connectives, these appear to be often preventable by expressing the connections more clearly and distinctly, such as expressing the different alternatives in the example above.

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, for most of the other subcategories of syntactic ambiguity, the modern approach requiring the considerations of context and the purpose of the statute often removes all but one of the multiple interpretations, alleviating most potential cases of “genuine ambiguity”.

Nevertheless in cases of “genuine ambiguity” perhaps noting different types of ambiguity can make it easier for some to know what type of ambiguity a specific example is, why it is ambiguous in a more conceptually clear manner, and what context, intents and additional information, if known, could alleviate this. 

Although several types of ambiguity have been noted, by no means is this list exhaustive.