This entry will be focusing on difficulties in interpreting what it means for something to truly be ambiguous, in comparison to that of vagueness or complexity for example. Furthermore, In addition to notions around a definite description of ambiguity, how ambiguity affects interpretations and responses to this will also be considered. 

Note: This entry will mainly be concerned with text-based ambiguity.

The Courts’ interpretation and responses to issues surrounding ambiguity as a concept in statutory interpretation

Defining Ambiguity

For the Courts it has been argued that the term ambiguity refers to words or phrases which have multiple meanings, and “genuine ambiguity” is reserved for text which, based on the modern approach, can be understood as having two or more plausible meanings based on the relevant context. 

As such in this section two distinctions noted by the court will be highlighted: ambiguity and vagueness, and ambiguity and “genuine ambiguity”

Although it appears obvious that ambiguity has something to do with uncertainty, what makes it different from other types of uncertainty? 

Ambiguity and vagueness

it has been considered that ambiguity is distinct from that of vagueness and generality. 

Vagueness has been noted as being notoriously difficult conceptually to clarify, but nevertheless has been noted by the Court as not relating to difficulty understanding the central meaning of a term where there are two or more plausible central interpretations of the term. Rather, it has been posited that vagueness occurs when a concept’s boundaries appear unclear. In this, it is unclear how to classify certain things at the borderline of the concepts meaning regarding if they are instances of it. 

Furthermore, another distinction listed between vagueness and ambiguity is in regard to intent. In this it has been noted that ambiguity, or at least issues resulting from it, arise from words or phrases which unintentionally have two or more incompatible interpretations. Conversely, language that is vague is sometimes intentionally implemented in legislation, where more rigid and concrete specifications are left to specialized actors better suited to this where this is performed on a case-by-case basis. 

Considering the above, it is clear that in trying to solve issues regarding ambiguity, it appears important to at least separate these from instances of vagueness to avoid trying to “fix” something intentional and permitted. 

Apart from distinguishing ambiguity from vagueness, it should also be mentioned how ambiguity can be different from “genuine ambiguity” 

Ambiguity and “genuine ambiguity.”

In this we will look at the modern approach to statutory interpretation and how ambiguity has been addressed in this. The modern approach to statutory interpretation is established as the following

“the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”

How this itself is interpreted has been noted as being an approach that considers text, context, and purpose. 

In this, text is a consideration that is necessary but not sufficient. There must be a plain reading of the text’s meaning; however, the text also needs to be understood in its relevant context. Additionally, the purpose of the provision which the text is placed in must also be considered. 

With this in mind, in statutory interpretation this is the primary approach to understanding the meaning of a statutory provision (cite 81). 

As such, it appears clear that a distinction between ambiguity and “genuine ambiguity” is warranted. Although a specific word or phrase’s meaning in a vacuum can be ambiguous, under the modern approach multiple interpretations appear implausible, making issues concerning ambiguity irrelevant. “Genuine ambiguity” on the other hand is when multiple plausible interpretations arise from a modern approach, which can create relevant issues in statutory interpretation. 

With this in mind, it appears that the main issues concerning uncertainty is when cases of “genuine ambiguity arise.

How has “genuine ambiguity” been resolved. 

Although “genuine ambiguity” is rare, when a court is presented with rival interpretations that cannot be resolved by a modern approach, the use of external interpretive aids is permitted.  

In this, external aids are materials used that exist outside of a statute’s provisions, context, and purpose. Examples noted by the court have been: 

“the principle of strict construction of penal laws or the presumption of conformity with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”

Overall, in regard to ambiguity, the courts have noted that it is specifically reserved for the notion of concepts which have two or more plausible interpretations, that it is distinct from vagueness, and that cases of ambiguity which arise after a modern approach are cases of “genuine ambiguity” where the use of external aids is permitted.

Philosophical considerations

Regarding the meaning of ambiguity and how it is distinct from vagueness, in many ways what the Courts concluded is largely similar to many philosophical positions. Namely that ambiguity is in regard to multiple interpretations and vagueness generally referring to difficulty with the borders of the term. 

Nevertheless, although there have been many cases regarding statutory interpretation that consider whether there is an instance of “genuine ambiguity”, the main considerations are the text, context, and purpose approach, and then if external aids are permitted.

In this, further abstract distinctions regarding types of ambiguity are more difficult to find in statutory interpretation. As such, this section seeks to explore different types of ambiguity noted in the philosophical discourse.

The goal of this is to bring more conceptual clarity as to why certain concepts words and phrases are cases of “genuine ambiguity” beyond notions of semantic ambiguity and bearing multiple interpretations. 

Additionally, a secondary goal is to consider whether there could be any benefits to considering these different types of ambiguity in statutory interpretation as external aids.     

Different types of ambiguity in philosophical discourse. 

1.  Lexical Ambiguity. 

In this, lexical ambiguity refers to words or phrases that are pronounced the same or spelled the same, but have different meanings or belong to different syntactic categories (these include nouns, verbs, adjectives, noun phrases, etc.). In this, examples noted are those such as the word “bat” where not only as a noun can this have multiple meanings, but it also can be placed in different syntactic categories. 

In this, this entry finds that its existence is similar to that of most semantic ambiguity present in statutory interpretation, where oftentimes context and the purpose of a statute or statement makes it clear what the clear meaning of the term or phrase is. 

Nevertheless, in a sense lexical ambiguity is the more appropriate term compared to semantic ambiguity as it includes the notion of syntactic categories, where in addition to words with different meanings themselves, it also accounts for words that are both in reference to the same general concept but are in different categories. For example “bat” as a noun and “bat” as a verb can both be related to something baseball related, but refer to different things based on their syntactic categories.

More difficult cases of lexical ambiguity appear to exist in the presence of quantifiers or 

2.  Syntactic ambiguity.    

In regard to syntactic ambiguity, this refers to text having multiple plausible interpretations due to how the text is structured, rather than the specific meanings of words or phrases themselves. 

In this there are many sub-categories of syntactic ambiguity, this entry will focus on categories which appear to either a.) common instances of ambiguity and b.) be understood without requiring any background information in formal logic.  

The first type of Syntactic ambiguity noted, sometimes referred to as thematic ambiguity, is in regard to whether a subject is doing an action or receiving an action. For example, “helping friends can make life better”. In this it can be interpreted as friends who are helpful can make (someone’s) life better; however, it can also be interpreted as helping out your friends can make (someone’s) life better. 

Another type of semantic ambiguity is when the interaction between operators or connectives appears unclear. For example, I went biking and swimming or running. In this one could interpret this as I either went biking and swimming, or I went biking and running; however, this could also be interpreted as I went biking and swimming, or I only went running. 

Notes on syntactic ambiguity and statutory law 

With this in mind, although these are cases of syntactic ambiguity, based on the modern approach, it seems rare for these to result in cases of genuine ambiguity. Concerning ambiguity based on connectives, these appear to be often preventable by expressing the connections more clearly and distinctly, such as expressing the different alternatives in the example above. Additionally for thematic ambiguity, it appears that in many cases by interpreting statutes through the modern approach, by considering the purpose of the statute it would clarify any ambiguity regarding whether it is in regard to a subject acting or being acted upon. 

 Syntactic ambiguity: quantifiers and scope. 

In these types of ambiguity, it looks at how ambiguity is based on structures which contain quantifiers and modals. This includes terms such as all, some, none, possible, necessary, impossible etc. Ambiguity surrounding this has been noted to revolve around scope subjects and relations between subjects. For example, “All humans come from a planet” can be interpreted as all humans come from some one planet in the universe, or it can be interpreted as all humans come from some planet in a general sense the universe in the sense that they cannot come from a star or an asteroid.   

Negation in meaning

Sometimes it appears that ambiguity can arise from negation or what negation can entail, especially when text also contains modal verbs. For example, on a strictly text based analysis one may interpret “do not intend X”  or “do not believe Y”, where it can be unclear if the negation applies to the modal verb, or the predicate of the proposition. However, although from a strict logical position, generally when the negation, in these cases the word not, is placed in front of the modal verb it means that the entire sentence is negated. With this in mind “do not intend X” would be interpreted as simply lacking the intention to do X, and, “do not believe Y” would be interpreted as simply withholding belief and holding a more skeptic position. However, although this is what has been considered to logically entail, often depending on the context of the statement, what can be meant is, intend to not do X, and believe not Y respectively. In this sense, whether these specific considerations are ambiguous at all is dependent. If the meaning of the text itself is written with the intention of being in alignment with its logical entailment then it is non-ambiguous; however, if the statement is written without this intention, then perhaps it is ambiguous. 

With all this in mind, although several types of ambiguity have been noted, by no means is this list exhaustive. 

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, with many of these types in mind it doesn’t appear that there is any particular type of ambiguity where an instance of it would also be an instance of “genuine ambiguity” based on the modern approach simply because it is an instance of that type of ambiguity. This appears to be clear due to the modern approach requiring the considerations of context and the purpose of the statute which often removes all but one of the multiple interpretations. Nevertheless in cases of “genuine ambiguity” perhaps this entry can make it easier for some to know what type of ambiguity it is and why it is ambiguous in a more conceptually clear manner.